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The Case of David v. Goliath:  Jewell v. 
NBC and the Basics of Defamacast in 
Georgia 
L. Lin Wood* 
 
Television in its young life has had many hours of 
greatness . . . and it has had its endless hours of mediocrity 
and its moments of public disgrace.  There are estimates 
that today the average viewer spends about two hundred 
minutes daily with television, while the average reader 
spends thirty-eight minutes with magazines and forty 
minutes with newspapers.  Television has grown faster 
than a teenager, and now it is time to grow up.  What you 
gentlemen broadcast through the people’s air affects the 
people’s taste, their knowledge, their opinions, their under-
standing of themselves and their world.  And their future. 
  —Newton Minow, Chairman of Federal 
Communications Commission (1961-63)1 
I want to discuss the importance of the television news 
medium to the American people.  No nation depends more 
on the intelligent judgment of its citizens.  No medium has 
a more profound influence over public opinion.  Nowhere 
 
* Partner, Wood & Grant, Atlanta, GA.  Mercer University, A.B. 1974; Wal-
ter F. George School of Law, Mercer University, J.D. 1977. The author was the 
lead civil attorney for Richard Jewell in his defamacast action against NBC and 
Tom Brokaw.  The facts of the case are set forth with the consent of the author’s 
client, Richard Jewell. 
1. Newton Minow, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Ad-
dress Before the National Association of Broadcasters, Washington, D.C. (May 9, 
1961), in WILLIAM SAFIRE, LEND ME YOUR EARS:  GREAT SPEECHES IN HISTORY 664-65 
(1992). 
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in our system are there fewer checks on vast power.  So 
nowhere should there be more conscientious responsibility 
exercised than by the news media.  The question is, Are we 
demanding enough of our television news presentations? 
And, are the men of this medium demanding enough of 
themselves? . . . In Will Rogers’ observation, what you 
knew was what you read in the newspaper.  Today, for 
growing millions of Americans, it is what they see and hear 
on their television sets. 
  — Vice President Spiro T. Agnew (1969-73)2 
Then David put his hand in his bag and took out a 
stone; and he slung it and struck the Philistine in his fore-
head, so that the stone sank into his forehead, and he fell on 
his face to the earth. 
  —1 Samuel 17:48 
INTRODUCTION 
At some point in your career, you may find an individual 
sitting across from you in your conference room complain-
ing of being “defamed” by false statements made during a 
television or radio broadcast.  Unless you are the rare plain-
tiffs’ lawyer able to build a successful practice specializing in 
the area of defamation law, you will next need to take a trip 
from your conference room to your law library to educate 
yourself on the intricacies of the law of defamation.  Your re-
search will undoubtedly leave you frustrated in your at-
tempt to understand the confusing laws of libel, slander, and 
“defamacast.”3 
This Essay attempts to clarify these confusing areas of 
 
2. Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, Address Before a Republican Gathering 
in Des Moines, Iowa (1969), in SAFIRE, supra note 1, at 654. 
3. See infra notes 8-12 and accompanying text (defining the term “defama-
cast” and discussing its origin). 
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law by first setting forth the basic starting points for a case of 
defamacast in Georgia.  This Essay then examines the factual 
setting of Jewell v. NBC4 and applies the defamacast law to 
those facts, in order to provide a contextual framework for 
understanding defamacast law. 
I. THE LAW OF DEFAMACAST 
When a defamation action is brought by an individual 
against a member of the press, the court is faced with com-
peting legal interests.  On the one hand, the individual has a 
common law right to the protection of his own good name.  
On the other hand, the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and the press.5 
A. Definition 
A “defamacast” is a defamation6 broadcast over either the 
television or radio airwaves.7  The term originated, coinci-
dentally, in Georgia, where it was coined by Judge Homer C. 
Eberhardt in the landmark decision of American Broadcasting-
 
4. The case was settled out of court for an undisclosed amount of money.  
See NBC, Lawyers for Jewell Settle Libel Allegations, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1996, at A3 
(discussing monetary settlement between Jewell and NBC for an undisclosed 
amount); see generally Symposium, Accountability of the Media in Investigations, 7 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 401 (1997) (colloquium between Wil-
liam Small and Richard Jewell’s attorney, L. Lin Wood, discussing the contro-
versy surrounding Richard Jewell). 
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Diamond v. American Family Corp., 368 S.E.2d 
350, 351 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 917 (1988). 
6. Defamation is defined as a communication that tends “to harm the repu-
tation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter 
third persons from associating or dealing with him.”  W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 112 (4th ed. 1971).  Defamation law protects a party’s “inter-
est in reputation and good name” by compensating for harm to reputation and 
by giving defamed persons an opportunity to vindicate their reputation in a pub-
lic forum.  Id. 
7. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 417 (6th ed. 1990) (defining defamacast as 
defamation by broadcast); L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 13 (1978) (de-
fining defamacast as an oral defamation communicated through the broadcast 
media); see, e.g., Williamson v. Lucas, 304 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (finding 
radio broadcast defamed public figure). 
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Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson,8 a case that arose out of a 
television broadcast of The Untouchables. In American Broad-
casting, Judge Eberhardt traced the development of the 
common law actions of libel and slander9 and recognized the 
 
8. 126 S.E.2d 873 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962); see Pierce v. Pacific & Southern Co., 
303 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (“In the case of American Broadcasting v. 
Simpson, Judge Homer C. Eberhardt . . . coined a new word, now in general use, 
which is quite descriptive of being defamed by television, to wit ‘defamacast.’”) 
(quoting Montgomery v. Pacific & S. Co., 206 S.E.2d 631, 634 (Ga. Ct. App.), aff’d, 
210 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1974).  In formulating this new area of law, the court 
stated “[d]efamation by broadcast or defamacast presents a factual situation un-
known to the common law and is in a new category.” Id. at 879.  The court 
added, “this case involve[s] a new type of publication of defamatory matter (a 
defamacast).”  Id. at 881; see also ELDREDGE, supra note 7 (discussing the emer-
gence of a new type of defamation, defamacast). 
In addition to Georgia courts, at least one district court has adopted the term 
defamacast.  See Spelson v. CBS, 581 F. Supp. 1195, 1203 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 
9.  At common law, the constitutional law of defamation consisted of the 
“twin torts of libel and slander.”  PROSSER, supra note 6, § 111, at 737.  While simi-
lar in all respects, except that libel is written defamation and slander is verbal, 
the two types of defamation developed different rules.  Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annota-
tion, Defamation by Radio or Television, 50 A.L.R.3d 1311, §§ 4-5 (1974).  Courts 
have recognized defamation by radio and television as a new species of tort, call-
ing it defamacast, in which distinctions between libel and slander are not appli-
cable.  Id. 
 The court recognized how the emergence of new media had been the impe-
tus for new law.  American Broadcasting, 126 S.E.2d at 877.  The common law first 
recognized a right of action only for slander.  Id.  It was not until the develop-
ment of the printing press did an action for printed defamation, called libel, 
arise.  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 568 Hist. n. b (1938)). Recognizing the 
lack of precedent for an action in defamation, the court noted that in the absence 
of binding precedent, the court “will reach a decision based upon sound princi-
ples and fair deductions from the common law.”  Tucker v. Howard L. Carmi-
chael & Sons, 65 S.E.2d 909, 910 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1951) (Per Duckworth, C.J.).  The 
court went on to state:  “The genius of the common law has been its ability to 
meet the challenges posed by changing circumstances.”  American Broadcasting, 
126 S.E.2d at 878.  As Judge Feld noted:  
If the base of liability for defamation is to be broadened in the case of 
radio broadcasting, justification should be sought not in the fiction that 
reading from a paper ipso facto constitutes a publication by writing, but 
in a frank recognition that sound policy requires such a result. . . . That 
defamation by radio, in the absence of a script or transcription, lacks the 
measure of durability possessed by written libel, in nowise lessens its 
capacity for harm.  Since the element of damage is, historically, the basis 
of the common-law action for defamation . . ., and since it is as reason-
able to presume damage from the nature of the medium employed 
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emergence of defamation by broadcast, terming it defama-
cast.10 
B. Statutory Basis of Claim 
Georgia has codified its common law of libel and slan-
der.11  The code addresses liability for defamatory state-
ments in visual or sound broadcast and recoverable dam-
ages:  
(a) The owner, licensee, or operator of a visual or 
sound broadcasting station or network of stations and 
                                                                                                                                  
when a slander is broadcast by radio as when published by writing, 
both logic and policy point the conclusion that defamation by radio 
should be action per se. 
Hartmann v. Winchell, 73 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1947). 
 Although defamacast includes elements of both libel and slander, such that 
certain traditional principles of both libel and slander apply, such categorization 
does not control in an action for defamacast.  American Broadcasting, 126 S.E.2d at 
876, 880 n.8.  Many courts have had difficulty reconciling defamacast with the 
traditional libel-slander dichotomy.  Id. at 877.  Some courts have said that dis-
tinctions between libel and slander are inapplicable in cases of defamation by 
radio or television.  See, e.g., Niehoff v. Congress Square Hotel Co., 103 A.2d 219 
(Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1954); Kelly v. Hoffman, 61 A.2d 143 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948); 
Greer v. Skyway Broadcasting Co., 124 S.E.2d 98 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1962); Summit 
Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A.2d 302 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1939). Courts 
disagree as to whether defamation by radio and television is a new tort or 
whether it is properly classified as libel or slander. See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annota-
tion, Defamation by Radio or Television, 50 A.L.R.3d 1311, 1319 (1990).  Where a 
written script is used, most courts treat defamation by radio and television as 
libel, see, e.g., Martins v. Coelho, 478 N.Y.2d 58 (App. Div. 1984); First Independent 
Baptist Church v. Southerland, 373 So. 2d 647 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1979); Gray v. WALA-
TV, 384 So. 2d 1062 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1980), whereas California courts treat it as 
slander, see, e.g., White v. Valenta, 234 Cal. App. 2d 243 (1965); Arno v. Stewart, 
245 Cal. App. 2d 955 (1966).  One commentator states that the modern trend is to 
treat broadcast statements as libel.  R. Hayes Johnson, Defamation in Cyberspace:  
A Court Takes a Wrong Turn on the Information Superhighway in Stratton Oakmont, 
Inc. v. Prodigy Servs., 49 ARK. L. REV. 589, 624 (1996). 
10.  Two of the most well-renowned commentators in the area of tort law 
were not fond of Judge Eberhardt’s chosen term, referring to the term defama-
cast as “a barbarous new word.”  PROSSER, supra note 6, § 112, at 787.  Even Judge 
Eberhardt himself noted, while coining the term defamacast, that “[w]hile this may be 
‘a glossoligical illegitimate,’ ‘a neological love-child’ we can think of nothing 
better.”   American Broadcasting, 126 S.E.2d at 879 n.7 (citation omitted).  
11. O.C.G.A. § 51-5 (1994); see Blackstone v. Fisher, 97 S.E.2d 322, 324 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1957). 
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the agents or employees of any owner, licensee, or 
operator shall not be liable for any damages for any 
defamatory statement published or uttered in or as a 
part of a visual or sound broadcast by one other than 
the owner, licensee, or operator or an agent or em-
ployee thereof, unless it is alleged and proved by the 
complaining party that the owner, licensee, operator 
or the agent or employee has failed to exercise due 
care to prevent the publication or utterance of the 
statement in the broadcast. 
(b) In no event shall any owner, licensee, or opera-
tor or the agents or employees of any owner, licensee, 
or operator of such a station or network of stations be 
held liable for any damages for any defamatory 
statement uttered over the facilities of the station or 
network by or on behalf of any candidate for public 
office. 
(c) In any action for damages for any defamatory 
statement published or uttered in or as a part of a vis-
ual or sound broadcast, the complaining party shall 
be allowed only such actual, consequential, or puni-
tive damages as have been alleged and proved.12 
C. Basic Elements of Claim 
A plaintiff bringing a defamacast action must prove that 
the alleged defamatory statement was in fact defamatory.13  
The burden of proof the plaintiff must meet in this regard is 
dependent upon whether the plaintiff is a public or private 
individual.14 
 
12. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-10. 
13. Id. 
14. The actual malice standard, as set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964), requires a plaintiff in a defamation action who is deemed to 
be a public figure or public official to prove that the defendant made the defama-
tory statement with “actual malice,” defined as “knowledge of the falsity or reck-
less disregard of the truth.”  Id. at 279-80.  The public plaintiff is required to 
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1. Utterance of a False Statement 
In an action for defamacast, the plaintiff must first prove 
that the statements complained of were false at the time they 
were made.15  While this initial step appears elementary, the 
question of whether the statements were false is often both 
the most difficult and the most important question to prove 
in the case.  Consequently, early in a defamacast case, per-
haps before filing the complaint or even agreeing to pursue 
the case, an attorney bringing a defamacast action should 
consider conducting a focus group to help determine 
whether the issue of falsity presents a difficult issue in the 
case.  Even if falsity appears to be a major problem, pursuit 
of a close case might be justified if the case has other, more 
positive aspects, such as extraordinary damage. 
a. Truth as an Absolute Defense 
The truth of a statement is an absolute defense to a defa-
mation action because falsity must be proven as part of the 
plaintiff’s case in chief.16  Accordingly, if the defendant can 
                                                                                                                                  
prove actual malice not merely by a preponderance of the evidence, but with 
“clear and convincing clarity.”  Id. at 285-86.  In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323 (1974), the Supreme Court summarized who will be considered a “pub-
lic figure,” and thus subject to the Sullivan standards:  
[The public figure] designation may rest on either of two alternative 
bases.  In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive 
fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and 
in all contexts.  More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects him-
self or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby be-
comes a public figure for a limited range of issues.  In either case such 
persons assume special prominence in the resolution of public ques-
tions. 
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. 
15.  O.C.G.A. § 15-5-1; Pierce, 303 S.E.2d at 319; Jones v. Neighborhood 
Newspapers, 236 S.E.2d 23, 25 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977).  
16. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-6 (“The truth of the charge made may always be proved 
in justification of an alleged libel or slander.”); see Masson v. New York, 501 U.S. 
496, 516-17 (1991); Bird v. Weis Broadcasting Corp., 388 S.E.2d 710, 711 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1989), cert. denied, 193 Ga. App. 657 (1990); Montgomery, 210 S.E.2d at 720 
(“[T]here is no dispute that truth is a complete defense except in a few jurisdic-
tions which make some exception.”); Savannah News Press v. Hartridge, 138 
S.E.2d 173, 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964); Pierce, 303 S.E.2d at 319. 
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prove that the allegedly defamatory statement is in fact true, 
the law requires a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. 
Many a defense lawyer will be quick to quote Blackstone as 
support for this proposition, as Justice Hiram K. Undercofler 
did in his dissenting opinion in Pacific & Southern Co. v. 
Montgomery:  
We suppose there has never been a time since recog-
nition of the action when truth was not an absolute 
defense.  Blackstone asserted:  ‘Also if the defendant 
be able to justify, and prove the words to be true, no 
action will lie, even though special damage hath en-
sued; for then it is no slander or false tale.  As if I can 
prove a tradesman a bankrupt, the physician a quack, 
the lawyer a knave, and the divine a heretic, this will 
destroy their respective actions; for though there may 
be damage sufficient accruing from it, yet, if the fact 
be true it is damnun absque injuria; and where there is 
no injury, the law gives no remedy. . . . The truth is an 
answer to the action, not because it negatives the 
charge of malice . . . but because it shows that the 
plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages.  For the 
law will not permit a man to recover damages in re-
spect to an injury to a character which he does not, or 
ought not, to possess.’17 
2. The False Statement Must Be Defamatory 
Defamacast is actionable whether the underlying defa-
mation action is based on libel or on slander.18  Because de-
 
17. 210 S.E.2d 714, 720 (citations omitted). 
18.  The Georgia Court of Appeals recognizes a separate cause of action for 
defamation by broadcast, “defamacast,” which includes both libel and slander.  
See, e.g., Pierce, 303 S.E.2d at 318 (“Defamation by telecast is now actionable by 
law regardless of whether it is in libel or slander.”); S & W Seafoods Co. v. Jacor 
Broadcasting of Atlanta, 390 S.E.2d 228 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 194 Ga. 
App. 912 (1990); Brewer v. Rogers, 439 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 2712 (1994); Montgomery v. Pacific & S. Co., 202 S.E.2d 631, 634, aff’d, 
Pacific & S. Co. v. Montgomery, 233 Ga. 175 (1974); American Broadcasting, 126 
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famacast contains elements of the laws of both libel and 
slander, an attorney bringing a defamacast action must con-
sider whether the false statement meets Georgia’s statutory 
definition of libel,19 or whether it falls within Georgia’s 
statutory definition of slander.20 
a. The Statement Must Be Viewed in Context 
In a defamacast action, a defamatory statement may be 
made in indirect terms or by insinuation; accordingly, “the 
publication thereof must be construed as a whole.”21  Like-
wise, it is true that defamation can be found not only in the 
actual words used, but also in the innuendo that may arise 
from the words.22 
                                                                                                                                  
S.E.2d at 879; WSAV-TV v. Baxter, 166 S.E.2d 416 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969). 
19. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-1(a).  A libel is a “false and malicious defamation of an-
other, expressed in print, writing, pictures, or signs, tending to injure the reputa-
tion of the person and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.” Id.   
20. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-4(a).  Slander or oral defamation is defined as:  
(a)(1) Imputing to another a crime punishable by law; 
(2) Charging a person with having some contagious disorder or 
with being guilty of some debasing act which may exclude him from 
society; 
(3) Making charges against another in reference to his trade, office, 
or profession, calculated to injure him therein; or 
(4) Uttering any disparaging words productive of special damage 
which flows naturally therefrom. 
Id. 
21. Thomason v. Times-Journal, Inc., 379 S.E.2d 551, 553 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 190 Ga. App. 899 (1989) (citing Garland v. State, 84 S.E.2d 9, 11 (Ga. Sup. 
Ct. 1954)).  The language must first be ambiguous before context will be consid-
ered, Southeastern Newspapers Inc. v. Walker, 44 S.E.2d 697, 700 (Ga. Ct. App. 1947) 
(stating that where “words are ambiguous . . . the plaintiff may . . . aver the 
meaning with which he claims that it was published”), because “if the words are 
clearly not defamatory, they cannot have their meaning enlarged by innuendo,” 
id.; see also Aiken v. Constitution Publishing Co., 33 S.E.2d 555 (Ga. Ct. App. 1945). 
22. Montgomery, 202 S.E.2d at 634 (stating that “[w]ords apparently innocent 
may convey a libelous charge when considered in connection with innuendo and 
circumstances surrounding the publication”); see also Davis v. Macon Tel. Pub-
lishing Co., 92 S.E.2d 619, 633, 635 (Ga. Ct. App. 1956)). 
A related concept is the “extrinsic fact” approach, which allows a plaintiff to 
use extrinsic evidence to show that a defamatory statement refers to her, al-
though she is not named in the statement.  American Broadcasting, 126 S.E.2d at 
880 (“[O]ne not named in the publication may show by extrinsic facts that the 
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Defense lawyers will invariably accuse the plaintiff of re-
lying on “isolated statements” and taking the alleged de-
famatory statements “out of context.”  While defamatory 
statements must be viewed in context with other pertinent 
comments or an entire conversation or report, correct, non-
defamatory statements in one part of a conversation or re-
port should not excuse or justify false, defamatory state-
ments in another part of the conversation or report. 
b. Statements of Opinion 
It is also espoused by many First Amendment defense 
lawyers that “opinion” cannot be the basis for a defamation 
action.  In fact, “[t]here is no ‘wholesale defamation exemp-
tion for anything that might be labeled opinion,’”23 because 
any such exemption would ignore the fact that expressions 
of opinion often imply an assertion of objective fact. 
c. The Average Listener Test 
The issue of defamation is, as a general rule, a matter of 
fact to be determined by a jury, except in the clearest of 
cases.24  The jury evaluates whether the allegedly defama-
tory statement is in fact defamatory by looking at what the 
average listener would construe the words to mean.25 
                                                                                                                                  
defamation applies to him.”).  Whether the plaintiff is within the group defamed 
is a question for the jury.  Id. at 880-81. 
23. Eidson v. Berry, 415 S.E.2d 16 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 202 Ga. App. 
905 (1992) (citing Milkovich v. Lorrain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990)). 
24. Brewer v. Rogers, 439 S.E.2d 77 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2712 (1994). 
25. Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Elliott, 302 S.E.2d 692, 694 (Ct.), (cert. va-
cated, 309 S.E.2d 142 (per curiam)), cert. denied 466 U.S. 971 (1983) (“[I]n consider-
ing whether a writing is defamatory as a matter of law, we look not at the evi-
dence of what the extrinsic circumstances were at the time indicated in the 
writing, but at what construction would be placed upon it by average reader.”) 
(citing Southeastern Newspapers v. Walker, 44 S.E.2d 697, 700 (1947)); Atlanta 
Journal Co. v. Doyal, 60 S.E.2d 802 (Ga. Ct. App. 1950); Garland v. State, 84 
S.E.2d 9 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1954).  The Georgia Supreme Court recognized this concept 
as early as in Little v. Barlow, 26 Ga. 423 (1858). 
   
1997] DAVID v. GOLIATH 683 
3. Private Individual or Public Official/Figure? 
Whether a plaintiff is a “public official” is generally not 
the source of a great deal of legal research or factual devel-
opment in discovery.26  However, whether an apparently 
private citizen will be deemed a “public figure” for purposes 
of a lawsuit is fertile ground for a legal battle that may not 
be resolved until appeal.27 
 
26. The Supreme Court defined the terms “public official” and “public offi-
cer” in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), explaining that public officials are 
government employees who hold “a position in government that [has] such ap-
parent importance that the public has an independent interest in the quality if 
the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the quality and 
performance of all government employees.” Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86.  Public of-
ficers are persons “in the hierarchy of government employees who have, or ap-
pear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the con-
duct of government affairs.”  Id. at 85.  Although the Supreme Court has stated 
that public officers do not include all public employees, see Hutchinson v. Prox-
mire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979), the Court’s definition does not clearly distin-
guish between public officials and mere government employees.  See id. 
27. The Supreme Court has defined a public figure as a person who has as-
sumed the risk of adverse publicity and criticism by affirmatively entering the 
public eye.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45.  This inexact standard has been deemed 
“much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall.”  Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 
411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976).  The rationale is that a public figure has an 
effective self-help remedy to use the mass media to rebut defamatory falsehoods:  
they are both less vulnerable to injury because of their opportunity to remedy the 
injury, and less deserving of recovery because they affirmatively put themselves 
in the public eye.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45. 
The scope of the privilege afforded a particular public figure depends upon 
the type of public figure the individual is.  Id.  The Supreme Court has recog-
nized three types of public figures:  the all-purpose public figure, the limited-
purpose public figure, and the involuntary-public figure.  Id.  General purpose 
public figures are individuals who have national and “pervasive fame or notori-
ety,” id. at 351; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976) (requiring “public 
figure” to have national, not merely local, notoriety), or “occupy positions of 
such pervasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all 
purposes,” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, and are protected by the Sullivan standard in all 
aspects of their lives. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345; see also J. BARRON & C. DENIES, 
HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS § 6:12 (1979). 
Limited purpose public figures are persons who “thrust themselves to the 
forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of 
the issue involved.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.  Therefore, the Sullivan privilege at-
taches only to the individual’s discussion of the public controversy involved.  
Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454-55.  Involuntary public figures, individuals who are 
thrust into the public limelight by no affirmative action on their own part, are 
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In a defamacast action, unless the contention does not 
pass the straight face-test, the defense will invariably claim 
that the plaintiff is a “public figure.”  The defense logic is 
simple:  most individuals who merit comment on television 
must have some personal appeal to the public or must be in-
volved in some public controversy.  The media defendant 
will often assert a defense which, in practical effect, was cre-
ated by its own act of placing a private individual in the 
public eye.  The plaintiff cannot over-prepare its legal re-
search and factual development in discovery on this issue 
because the law to be applied and the plaintiff’s burden of 
proof at trial will depend on its resolution. 
a. Categorization of Person in General 
Whether an individual is a public figure is a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis 
by the court, rather than by the jury.28 
b. Private Individuals 
A private individual may recover if it is demonstrated, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the broadcaster 
failed to use “ordinary care” to determine the truth or falsity 
of the statement.29  A broadcaster may be held liable even for 
                                                                                                                                  
truly rare and receive Sullivan protection for the limited reason for which they 
were put in the public eye.  Id. 
28. Brewer v. Rogers, 439 S.E.2d at 81 (citing Sewell v. Eubanks, 352 S.E.2d 
802, 803-04 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Williams v. Trust Co. of Ga., 230 S.E.2d 45, 49 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1976)); see also Ellerbee v. Mills, 422 S.E.2d 539, 542 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 
1992) (Fletcher, J., concurring). 
29. Diamond, 368 S.E.2d at 353, overruling Montgomery v. Pacific & S. Co., 
206 S.E.2d 631 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974); WSAV-TV v. Baxter, 166 S.E.2d 416 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1969).  The Georgia Supreme Court applied to broadcasters the relaxed 
standard of ordinary care established in Gertz for publishers, and which had 
been adopted by the majority of states.  Triangle Publications v. Chumley, 317 
S.E.2d 534, 536 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1984).  The standard of ordinary care requires a 
broadcaster to employ “that degree of care required of a reasonable broadcaster 
under the circumstances” to determine the truth or falsity of the statement.  Dia-
mond, 368 S.E.2d at 353.  Whether a defendant has practiced the requisite care is a 
question for the jury to decide.  Triangle Publications, 317 S.E.2d at 537-38. 
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a newsworthy report if it contains a defamatory statement 
and if the broadcaster failed to employ the procedures a rea-
sonable broadcaster under the circumstances would have 
employed to assure the accuracy of the statement before 
broadcasting the report.30 
In Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Chumley,31 the Supreme 
Court of Georgia adopted the ordinary care standard for 
defamation of a “private figure plaintiff” and enunciated 
some guidelines for defining this standard of conduct:  
At trial of the negligence issue, the standard of con-
duct required [of defendant] will be defined by refer-
ence to the procedures a reasonable publisher in [de-
fendant’s] position would have employed prior to 
publishing an advertisement such as this one.  [De-
fendants] will be held to the skill and experience 
normally exercised by members of their profession.  
Custom in the trade is relevant but not controlling. 
When applying the ordinary care standard . . . , the 
jury is authorized to consider, among other factors:  
(1) whether the material was topical and required 
prompt publication, or whether sufficient time was 
available for a thorough investigation of its contents; 
(2) the newsworthiness of the material and public in-
terest in promoting its publication; (3) the extent of 
damage to the plaintiff’s reputation should the publi-
cation prove to be false; . . . and (4) the reliability and 
truthworthiness [sic] of the source.  The thoroughness 
of the accuracy check a reasonable person would 
make before publishing a defamatory statement will 
vary, depending on the relative weight of these fac-
tors and the circumstances of the case.32 
 
30. Diamond, 368 S.E.2d at 353. 
31. 317 S.E.2d 534 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1984). 
32. Id. at 537 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 580(b), cmt. g (1972)). 
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c. Public Officials and Public Figures 
If the public plaintiff33 is a public official or public figure, 
however, the plaintiff must show actual malice, not simply a 
failure of ordinary care.  Furthermore, actual malice must be 
shown by clear and convincing proof, rather than by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.34  These showings are constitu-
tionally required under New York Times v. Sullivan,35 which 
held that a public figure may not recover damages for a de-
famatory falsehood without clear and convincing proof that 
the false statement was made with actual malice, and de-
fined actual malice as making a defamatory statement with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not.36  Under Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc.,37 “an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or 
notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes 
and in all contexts[, or,] [m]ore commonly, an individual 
voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular pub-
lic controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a 
limited range of issues.”38  In either case, such persons as-
 
33. For purposes of this Essay, the term “public plaintiffs” refers to public 
officials and public figures collectively. 
34.  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86 (requiring a public plaintiff to prove with 
“convincing clarity” that defendant made statement with actual malice).  The Sul-
livan progeny revised the clear and convincing standard.  See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 
472 U.S. 749 (1985).  In order to establish liability for defamation under the rule of 
Sullivan and its progeny, public officials and public figures must not only prove “ac-
tual malice”—defined as “knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard of the truth,” 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80, but also must do so with clear and convincing clarity. Id. 
at 285-86.  To prove actual malice, a public plaintiff must show that defendant at 
least “entertained serious doubts as to the truth” of the supposedly defamatory 
statement.  St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).  
35. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
36. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (defining “actual malice”); see 
also supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing convincing clarity standard 
of proof). 
37. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
38. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 351; see, e.g., Byers v. Southeastern Newspaper 
Corp., 288 S.E.2d 698 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 161 Ga. App. 717 (1982) (holding 
the dean of a state college a public figure for the limited purpose of his participa-
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sume special prominence in the resolution of public ques-
tions. 
4. Respondeat Superior 
In a slander action, a corporation or employer cannot be 
held liable for the defamatory statement of an agent or em-
ployee unless it affirmatively appears that the agent or em-
ployee was expressly directed or authorized to slander the 
plaintiff.39  Because a defamacast is not considered to be 
slander, it has been held that the libel rule recognizing re-
spondeat superior liability is applicable to an action for de-
famacast.40 
5. Damages 
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, 
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:  
Who steals my purse steals trash; ‘tis 
          something, nothing; 
‘Twas mine, ‘tis his, and has been slave 
          to thousands; 
But he that filches from me my good name 
Robs me of that which not enriches him, 
And makes me poor indeed.41 
Private plaintiffs may recover compensatory damages on 
proof of mere fault, but may not recover punitive damages 
absent proof the defendant acted with actual malice.42 
                                                                                                                                  
tion in controversy relating to his tenure as dean of college).  In Gertz, the Su-
preme Court addressed the issues raised in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, which had 
held that the Sullivan privilege extend not only to public plaintiffs, but also to all 
“matters of public or general concern.”  Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 
44 (1971), overruled by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).  Gertz 
overruled Metromedia by limiting the expansion of Sullivan to only the discussion 
of public officials and public figures.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323. 
39. Garren v. Southland Corp., 228 S.E.2d 870 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1976). 
40. Williamson v. Lucas, 304 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). 
41. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3. 
42. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.  Proof of actual malice is required to impose liabil-
ity for statements defaming a public figure.  See Byers v. Southeastern Newspa-
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a. Actual or Consequential Damages 
Actual damages is not necessarily restricted to monetary 
loss.43  Indeed, “[w]ounding a man’s feelings is as much ac-
tual damage as breaking his limbs.”44 
b. Punitive Damages 
In a defamacast action recovery for punitive damages for 
a private individual or a public plaintiff is not permissible 
without a showing that the broadcaster possessed knowl-
edge of the falsity of the defamatory statement or exercised 
reckless disregard for the truth, that is, that he acted with ac-
tual malice as required by Sullivan.45 
6. Retraction Demand 
While not expressly mandatory, the retraction demand 
procedure established by Georgia statutory law should be 
deemed as mandatory as a practical matter.46  The retraction 
                                                                                                                                  
per Corp., 288 S.E.2d 698, (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 161 Ga. App. 717 (1982); 
Sewell v. Eubanks, 352 S.E.2d 802, 803 (Ct. App. Ga. 1987). 
The United States Supreme Court in Gertz permitted the states to define for 
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for defamation, restricting them 
only from imposing liability without fault.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 360.  The guidelines 
set forth in Gertz permit recovery of punitive damages for defamation only on a 
showing of actual malice.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 396.  Although Gertz relaxed the 
standard of proof necessary for a plaintiff to recover actual damages for defama-
tion, the evidence must still meet the more demanding standard of “actual mal-
ice” for recovery of punitive damages.  Diamond, 368 S.E.2d at 354.  Defamacast 
statutes, on the other hand, permit the recovery of those actual consequential 
and punitive damages as are alleged and proved.  Fuqua Television, Inc. v. Flem-
ing, 215 S.E.2d 694, 696 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975). 
43. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-10(c). 
44. Fuqua, 215 S.E.2d at 696 (quoting Head v. Georgia Pac. Ry. Co., 7 S.E. 217 
(Ga. Sup. Ct. 1887); Mabry v. City Electric Ry Co., 42 S.E. 1025 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 
1902)). 
45. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349; Diamond v. American Family Corp., 368 S.E.2d 
350 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 917 (1988).  Because actual mal-
ice is part of the public plaintiff’s case in chief, the issue does not affect the pub-
lic plaintiff’s case.  Fuqua, 215 S.E.2d at 696 (stating that recovery is available for 
both actual and punitive damages). 
46. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-12 (Supp. 1996). 
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demand provision will inevitably impact the damage issues 
at trial and may control the admissibility of evidence con-
cerning the demand or lack of demand for retraction:  
(a) In any civil action for a defamatory statement 
which charges the visual or sound broadcast of an er-
roneous statement alleged to be defamatory, it shall 
be relevant and competent evidence for either party 
to prove that the plaintiff requested retraction or 
omitted to request retraction. 
(b) In any such action, the defendant may allege and 
give proof of the following matters, as applicable:  
(1) (A) That the matter alleged to have been 
broadcast and to be defamatory was published 
without malice; 
(B) That the defendant, in a regular broadcast of 
the station over which the broadcast in question 
was made, within three days after receiving writ-
ten demand, corrected and retracted the allegedly 
defamatory statement in as conspicuous and pub-
lic a manner as that in which the alleged defama-
tory statement was broadcast; and 
(C) That, if the plaintiff so requested, the retraction 
and correction were accompanied, on the same 
day, by an editorial in which the allegedly de-
famatory statement was specifically repudiated; or 
(2) That no request for correction and retraction 
was made by the plaintiff. 
(c) Upon proof of the facts specified in paragraph (1) 
or (2) of subsection (b) of this Code section, the plain-
tiff shall not be entitled to any punitive damages and 
the defendant shall be liable only to pay actual dam-
ages.  The defendant may plead the broadcast of the 
correction, retraction, or explanation, including the 
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editorial, if demanded, in mitigation of damages.47 
In the event the issuance of a retraction is made as con-
templated by the statute, the retraction only addresses dam-
age issues and does not bar the lawsuit for defamacast.  
Sometimes defamacast actions address, what is a jury issue, 
the question of whether or not the correction and retraction 
was broadcast “in as conspicuous and public a manner as 
that in which the alleged defamatory statement was broad-
cast.”48 
II. JEWELL V. NBC ANALOGIZED TO DAVID AND GOLIATH 
A. Richard Jewell as David 
Richard Jewell was working as a private security guard 
in the early morning hours of Saturday, July 27, 1996, when 
he discovered the infamous unattended package now known 
to contain the bomb that would explode at Centennial 
Olympic Park, killing one person and injuring over one 
hundred others.49  Although initially credited with saving 
many lives for his role in spotting the package and in evacu-
ating park patrons,50 Richard Jewell was later identified in 
an Olympic extra edition (check if need caps on Extra Edi-
tion) of Atlanta Journal, on the afternoon of July 30, as a sus-
pect in the FBI’s bombing investigation.51  On October 26, 
 
47. Id.  
48. Id. 
49. Max Frankel, An Olympian Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at 60; Mike 
Lopresti, Guard’s Alertness in Park Makes Him an Unexpected Hero, USA TODAY, July 
29, 1996, at 4A. 
50. See Kent E. Walker, Atlanta Games Day 12.  Olympic City Heroes at the Park:  
Guard’s Quick Thinking Saved Lives, ATL. J. & CONST., July 30, 1996, at S29 (proclaiming 
Richard Jewell a “hero” and describing how he saved hundreds of lives by his quick 
thinking).  On May 15, 1997, the American Police Hall of Fame honored Richard 
Jewell for saving the lives of countless people by helping to evacuate Centennial 
Park after spotting the suspicious package which contained the bomb.  See Hero-
Turned-Villain-Turned Hero Honored By Cops, STAR LEDGER, May 17, 1997, at 3; Jewell 
Honored for Saving People, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 18, 1997, at 5A. 
51. Kathy Scruggs & Ron Martz, FBI Suspects “Hero” Guard May Have 
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1996, the United States Department of Justice declared in 
writing that, based on the evidence developed in the investi-
gation, Richard Jewell was not considered a target of the 
bombing investigation.52  Richard Jewell was never arrested; 
he was never charged with any crime.  In fact, Richard 
Jewell was an innocent man. 
B. NBC and Tom Brokaw as Goliath 
Tom Brokaw53 is the anchor of NBC Nightly News.  On 
Tuesday, July 30, 1996, Mr. Brokaw appeared on NBC 
PrimeTime Evening News, hosted by Bob Costas, which was 
covering Day 12 of the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games in 
Atlanta, Georgia.54  NBC was reported to have averaged a 
“twenty rating”55 for the broadcast, meaning it was viewed 
                                                                                                                                  
Planted Bomb, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 30, 1996, Extra J. Ed., at X1; see The At-
lanta Olympic Bombing Case and Possible FBI Leaks to the Media:  Hearings Before the Ter-
rorism, Technology & Government Information Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 
104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (testimony of Louis Freeh, Director, FBI). 
52. Pierre Thomas & Bill McAllister, Guard No Longer a Suspect in Olympic 
Park Bombing; Justice Department Serves Formal Notice, WASH. POST., Oct. 27, 1996, 
at A1. 
53. One might analogize Richard Jewell and NBC and Tom Brokaw to the 
Biblical characters David and Goliath.  Analogizing NBC and Tom Brokaw to 
Goliath in fact exceeds the implications of the Biblical story, as NBC (as well as 
its parent company, General Electric) and Mr. Brokaw clearly fit the non-biblical 
definition of Goliath:  a person or thing of colossal power or achievement. See 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 976 (3d ed. 1986) (defining Go-
liath, in the non-biblical sense, as giant).  In the Biblical sense, Goliath is the Phil-
istine giant whom David killed with a stone shot from a sling.  1 Samuel 17:4 
(“And a champion went out from the camp of the Philistines, named Goliath, 
from Gath, whose height was six cubits and a span.”); id. at 17:49 (“Then David 
put his hand in his bag and took out a stone; and he slung it and struck the Phil-
istine in his forehead, so that the stone sank into his forehead, and he fell on his 
fact to the earth.”); see infra note 57 (quoting the biblical scene in which David 
slays Goliath). 
54. NBC Nightly News with Tom Brokaw (NBC television broadcast, July 30, 
1996). 
55. A “rating” is the percentage of television viewers tuned in to a particular 
program out of all potential viewers. See How Nielsen Measures Ratings, PEORIA J. 
STAR, Jan. 5, 1997, at C11.  Competing companies provide rating services, one of 
which is Nielsen Media Research.  Id.  Nielsen Media Research gathers ratings for 
programs on nationwide broadcast and cable stations.  Id.  Five thousand house-
holds, selected at random, are fitted with a device that records programs being 
   
692 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [7:673 
by more than twenty million households.  During the broad-
cast, the following exchange occurred between Tom Brokaw 
and Bob Costas:  
MR. BROKAW:  FBI agents do have [Jewell’s] apart-
ment under surveillance tonight, and even though 
there is no search warrant that we know of, none of 
the high level sources that NBC has been talking to is 
waving us off Mr. Jewell as the focus of this investiga-
tion.  So, Bob, that is what we know at this hour. 
MR. COSTAS:  If, for the sake of argument, Mr. Jew-
ell’s lawyer is correct and people are barking up the 
wrong tree and he ultimately is not arrested, they 
have done him a grave disservice. 
MR. BROKAW:  I think it is going to be acutely em-
barrassing for the FBI as well.  I don’t know whether 
they are going to arrest him tonight.  The speculation 
is that the FBI is close to making the case, in their lan-
guage.  They probably have enough to arrest him 
right now, probably enough to prosecute him, but 
you always want to have enough to convict him as 
well.  There are still some holes in this case. 
MR. COSTAS:  So let’s assume that that’s true and 
they do arrest him and they have enough evidence.  
Again, for the sake of argument, they arrest him to-
morrow or the next day.  You might ask, why not 
wait until then before saying anything publicly?  Why 
toss this guy out there now? 
MR. BROKAW:  I think one of the reasons that they 
                                                                                                                                  
viewed at any given time. Id.  Through information compiled from these “Nielsen” 
homes, television programs are given “ratings.”  Id. 
The popularity of a television program is also measured by “shares;” a television 
program’s “share” is the percentage of televisions tuned in to a particular program, 
out of all televisions in use at that time.  Id.  For example, if 20% of the Nielsen 
households who are watching television at a given time tune in to the NBC televi-
sion program “Seinfeld,” the show gets a “20 share.” See id.  Consequently, a 20 share 
is usually substantially fewer viewers than a 20 rating.  See id. 
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may be doing this is that there is, in the language of 
the FBI or in the law enforcement, they sweat a guy.  
And one of the ways that you do that is put the kind 
of public pressure that he has on him tonight.  Now, 
we have to be absolutely clear that everyone under-
stands, he is not yet officially a suspect.  He is the fo-
cus of this investigation.  But this is coming to us from 
everywhere, Washington, Atlanta, Pete Williams who 
covers the Justice Department, Fred Francis covers 
everybody down here.  They are only using one name 
tonight, and that is Richard Jewell. 
MR. COSTAS:  Tom, thanks.  I am sure we will be 
talking to you again soon. 
The ultimate question is whether Richard Jewell was the 
victim of a defamacast as the result of the previous state-
ments by Tom Brokaw.56 
III. THE ANSWER:  A JURY QUESTION 
They probably have enough to arrest him right now, proba-
bly enough to prosecute him . . . . They are only using one 
name tonight, and that is Richard Jewell. 
  —Tom Brokaw 
The viewing public believes that the major network news 
anchors report news in a truthful manner.  The viewing pub-
lic believes Dan Rather and Peter Jennings.  The viewing 
public believes Tom Brokaw. 
On July 30, 1996, at a time when the FBI was not even 
willing to publicly acknowledge that Richard Jewell was an 
official “suspect,” the gist of Tom Brokaw’s statements to 
millions of television viewers was that the FBI had its man 
 
56. In addition to suing the broadcast network NBC, Richard Jewell’s attor-
neys brought, and continue to bring, actions against the print media.  See Jewell 
Sues Papers, College Over Olympic Blast Stories, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1997, at A5. 
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and its man was Richard Jewell.  Tom Brokaw turned inves-
tigative suspicions into legal probabilities.  The average 
viewer could not ignore the clear implication of the Brokaw 
comments that there was, in all probability, damning evi-
dence against Richard Jewell warranting his arrest and 
prosecution for bombing Centennial Olympic Park. 
The problem is that Tom Brokaw’s statements were false.  
No evidence had been developed as of July 30 (nor at any 
time thereafter) that was legally sufficient to justify the arrest 
or prosecution of Richard Jewell.  Richard Jewell was an in-
nocent man. 
The statements by Tom Brokaw were defamatory.  The 
bomber of Centennial Olympic Park faces the federal pun-
ishment of death for an act of terrorism.  To state falsely to 
the viewing public that evidence existed sufficient to justify 
the arrest and prosecution of Richard Jewell unquestionably 
injured his reputation, exposed him to public hatred, con-
tempt, and ridicule, and imputed to him a crime punishable 
by death. 
The statements by Tom Brokaw were uttered with a reck-
less disregard for their truth or falsity.  Mr. Brokaw’s charac-
terization of the evidence against Richard Jewell was noth-
ing more than his personal conclusions stated as objective 
fact to the viewers; there was no prior substantiation what-
soever from credible law enforcement sources.  Tom Brokaw 
made the statements at the same time he acknowledged that 
there had been no search warrant issued, that Mr. Jewell was 
not an official suspect, and that there were holes in the case 
against Mr. Jewell.  These acknowledged facts required Mr. 
Brokaw to refrain from stating that there was sufficient evi-
dence to arrest and prosecute Mr. Jewell.  These undisputed 
facts, acknowledged by Mr. Brokaw, demanded further in-
vestigation by NBC into the credibility of the government 
leak of Mr. Jewell’s name, not an on-the-air evaluation by 
Mr. Brokaw of the evidence against Mr. Jewell. 
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Early in any criminal investigation, there will usually be 
a number of individuals investigated by law enforcement 
authorities.  Most of these early “suspects” are innocent and 
are never charged with, or arrested for, any crime.  The 
American people cannot, and should not, tolerate their na-
tional news anchors first revealing the identity of these early 
suspects of an investigation and then falsely informing the 
viewing public that there is evidence justifying that individ-
ual’s arrest and prosecution.  When conduct occurs, as it did 
in the case of Richard Jewell, there must be accountability.  
But for the out-of-court settlement by NBC with Richard 
Jewell, I am confident a jury would have found Mr. Brokaw 
accountable for his false statements by answering the ulti-
mate question with a resounding, “yes.” 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the same trial considerations apply to a de-
famacast action as apply to any other personal injury action.  
The success of the case will most likely turn, in large part, on 
how well the jury likes the plaintiff and the degree of prepa-
ration by the involved attorneys.  Cases involving “honest 
mistake” types of false statements are best avoided, while 
concentrating on aggressively handling cases involving seri-
ous, false attacks on an individual’s character and reputa-
tion.  Even cases involving a private individual as plaintiff 
should develop and present “reckless disregard” evidence, 
not only for the possible recovery of punitive damages, but 
also to persuade the jury to the plaintiff’s side on the liability 
issue in the first instance.  The reality is that few plaintiffs’ 
attorneys can afford to “specialize” in the area of defamation, 
but defense lawyers can command big reputations and even 
bigger incomes serving as “defenders of the First Amend-
ment” for their media clients.  The plaintiff needs as large a 
stone as possible in his or her sling. 
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Finally, remember at all times:  David won.57 
 
 
57. 1 Samuel 17:50 (“So David prevailed over the Philistine with a sling and 
a stone, and struck the Philistine and killed him.”). 
